zionism.israel-live.de
The aim of this pamphlet is not to
speculate on the future of Palestine, nor to provide a solution of the
problem, but to describe the events leading up to the situation in
Palestine today. Dr. Parkes gives an account of the position of the
British, the Arabs, and the Jews in Palestine at the end of the last
war, and traces the political history since that date, a melancholy
story of the clash of apparently irreconcilable rights and of legitimate
but incompatible interests. "Palestine is still waiting for the Solomon,
whether British, Jew, or Arab, who will produce a political solution."
"Fortunately there is another and brighter
side to the picture. 'None of the paradoxes that the world can offer are
as startling as the contrast between the barren stagnation of the
political conflict, which suggests a country in which neither change nor
progress can be expected, and the transformation of life wrought in the
last twenty years, which would appear to have been possible only in a
land of complete peace, harmony, and security."
The remainder of the pamphlet describes
some of the important social, industrial, and economic experiments made
in Palestine in the last twenty years and the large measure of success
which has attended them.
James Parkes, the author is a leading
authority on the Jewish question, and his latest work is his volume on
The Jewish Problem in the Modern World published in the Home
University Library in 1939.
FIRST PUBLISHED 30 MAY 1940
REPRINTED DEC. 1941
Printed in Great Britain and published
by
THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Amen House, E.C
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK
TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPETOWN BOMBAY
CALCUTTA MADRAS
HUMPHREY MILFORD
PALESTINE
The Problem of Palestine
HOWEVER difficult the problem of Palestine may be to
solve, it is easy to state. Palestine is a tiny country, until 1918 a
portion of the Turkish Empire, with to-day not quite a million and a
half inhabitants; but every occurrence, every project, in Palestine
affects the interests of three completely separate peoples, each with
world-wide connexions —the British, the Arabs, and the Jews. It is not
surprising that in such circumstances it has proved extremely difficult,
and often impossible, to find a formula or a plan which satisfies all
the partners equally. The easiest way to get a clear picture is to
consider first the separate position at the end of the last war of each
element in the Palestinian situation in itself, without reference to the
others.
The British in Palestine
The Near-Eastern campaign in the war of 1914-18 was
an inevitable development of Allied strategy. It was impossible
to
allow the Turks, who were allied with the Germans, to threaten the
vital communications of the British" Empire by their control of
the
eastern bank of the Suez Canal and the eastern shores of the Red
Sea. Hence Allenby advanced into Palestine in the .autumn of 1917,
entering Jerusalem in December of that year, while the desert
Arabs, led by the Emir Feisal with the aid of Lawrence, pushed'
the
Turks northwards and entered Damascus in the autumn of 1918.
After the war Palestine became even more important.
British security still demanded the control of the east bank of the
canal; the development of imperial air communications made Palestine a
potential link in lines to India and the Far East; the motor road across
the desert to Bagdad could be reached from the country, and one end of
the oil pipe-line from the Iraqian wells at Kirkuk debouched at the
Palestinian port of Haifa, which was also one of the best naval stations
in the eastern Mediterranean.
Such is the basic British interest in the country, an
interest analogous to those which, in the past, have led to the British
control of Gibraltar, Malta, or" Singapore. It is a vital link in the
communications of a world-wide empire, and Britain cannot be indifferent
to its fate. In old days she might simply have annexed the country after
her conquest. In actual fact she obtained it after the war as a Mandate
from the League of Nations.
From this point of view the one essential is that the
country should be stable and prosperous, for a weak and divided country
offers endless opportunities to intrigue, and there are several Powers
only too willing to fish in its troubled waters.
The Arabs
In so far as its inhabitants were concerned, there was
in 1919 no such thing as a Palestinian nationality, in the sense in
which there is Portuguese nationality giving fairly clear indications of
the natural areas of the Portuguese State. The present frontiers of
Palestine, while they look more or less familiar to an Englishman or a
Jew accustomed to maps of Palestine in Bible days,
were only fixed after the Versailles Conference. The country formed part
of two Turkish provinces, and its inhabitants were just part of that
vast Arab section of the Turkish Empire which stretched from the
Mediterranean to Persia. They did not think of themselves as
Palestinians, but as Syrians who were part of the Moslem world and
partoftheArabpeople.
Hence, on the one hand, they identified their situation
with that of other Arab States in the Near East, and, on the other,
Moslems all over the world were interested in their circumstances, as
Jerusalem is the third holiest city in the Moslem world.
In 1922, when the first census was taken of the present
territory, the Arab population numbered some 664,000, of whom 73,000
were Christians. More than half the Moslem Arabs were peasants,
cultivating about one-half of the soil of Palestine by methods which had
altered little since Bible days. The main reasons for this situation lay
in the poverty of the soil and the poverty of the peasant; and each
reacted on the other, keeping the unfortunate inhabitants in an almost
permanent state of indebtedness. The Arab was neither lazy nor
improvident; his iron-shod wooden plough, his sickle for reaping, were
the most effective instruments within his means. Improved cultivation
and the extension of the area cultivated were only possible with
artificial manures and irrigation, neither of which the cultivator could
afford. A great deal of the land belonged to a small number of
landlords, of whom some lived outside the country and were entirely
uninterested in the condition of their tenants. Of what was left much
was held communally, but even where a village owned its own land there
was no inducement to the individual to improve his soil, since after a
couple of crops it passed into other hands.
A tenth of the Moslem Arabs were still wandering
shepherds, living in tribes, and grazing their flocks over wide but
vaguely defined areas. There was no really accurate land register, a
situation which caused considerable difficulties in the early years of
the British administration, and has not yet been entirely remedied.
The Christian Arabs lived more in the towns, and
provided a high proportion of the professional, official, and artisan
class. A rich Moslem was almost invariably a landowner, a rich Christian
often a merchant or official. The urban proletariat was small, for large
towns were few, and commercial or industrial life extremely backward.
The Jews
The Jews are at once the most ancient and the most
recent of the settled inhabitants of Palestine;
and, while it is true that the circumstances connected
with their dramatic return to their 'National Home' are the cause of
most of the present complications, it is also true that Jewish
enterprise provides by far the most interesting part of the story of the
last twenty years in Palestine.
Throughout the last two thousand years the country has
never wholly lacked Jewish inhabitants. Sometimes they were to be
numbered by hundreds, sometimes by tens of thousands. But some there
always were. They came to 'the land of Israel' to lament the fallen
state of their nation, to bury themselves in its religious life and
history, or to die there in its holy ground. It is only in the second
half of the nineteenth century that vigorous young Jews began to return,
not to die but to live, not to study on holy ground but to cultivate it.
It was out of this return to Zion that the Zionist Movement was born.
Persecution in Russia and even in western Europe stimulated it, and in
i9i4-there were already more than 10,000 Jewish settlers owning or
cultivating 90,000 acres of Palestinian soil.
At the same time these colonists were a small minority
of the actual Jewish population of the country in 1914. Jerusalem was
already a city in which the majority of the populatibn was Jewish,
though most were of the old-fashioned and religious type who did nothing
to cultivate the soil or to earn their living. Similar groups lived in
Hebron and in the north, but side by side with them there was springing
up an urban population of artisans and traders possessed by the same
ideals which had created the colonies, the rebuilding of a national home
in the ancestral country.
But life under Turkish rule was uncertain, their
position was never really secure, and it was with relief that they
hailed the coming of the British and the passing of the country into
British control. From the area controlled by the British many colonists
volunteered and took part in sweeping the Turks out of the country. It
was typical of the idealism of their whole outlook that, within actual
sound of the booming of the guns, the foundation stones of a Hebrew
University were laid outside Jerusalem.
The War-time Promises:
(a) to the Arabs
It is not as Palestinians but as Arabs that the
inhabitants of Palestine claim to be included in the promises made by
the British in the Near East at various stages of the war of 1914-18.
They were part of the Arab world which the British incited to rebel
against Turkey.
It was to secure this revolt that in 1915 Sir Henry
McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, approached Sherif Hussein,
the accepted leader of Arab Nationalists, with an offer of help if he
would raise a revolt against the Turks. He was willing to join forces
with the British provided the Arab world was promised independence. The
British excepted certain areas in the west, but otherwise agreed to his
desires. Unfortunately these areas were very vaguely'described, so that
it is possible for the British to say quite sincerely that they
certainly meant the whole of Palestine to be excluded from their
promises, and for Arabs to claim the opposite. Meanwhile, the British,
convinced that they had not promised Palestine to Hussein, proceeded to
make various secret agreements with the French and Russians which
involved Palestine, and Hussein, whose real interests were elsewhere,
left the matter unsettled. For the full story of the promises to tht,
Arabs other conversations would have to be related at length, but for
our purpose it is enough, that at the Peace Conference the Arab
delegates, led by the son of Hussein, the Emir Feisal, later King of
Iraq, agreed to the exclusion of Palestine from their hoped-for Arab
State; and Feisal even negotiated an agreement with Dr. Weizmann, the
leader of the Zionists, on condition that the other Arab countries were
given their independence. Thus the war-time tangle seemed satisfactorily
smoothed out.
Unfortunately this was not to be. The Arab countries
were not given their independence, for France claimed amandateover
Syria, and the British over Iraq. Thus Feisal's agreement with Dr.
Weizmann fell to the ground. But a more serious misfortune was that all
this time no representatives of the actual inhabitants of the country
had been heard, since the Palestine of to-day was not a political unit
at that time. The Arab authorities with whom Britain negotiated had come
from Mecca or Syria. But as soon as an organization of Palestinian Arabs
came into being, they not unnaturally claimed the same independence as
had been offered to other Arab countries; and they absolutely refused to
accept the validity of any promise which the Allied nations had'made to
the Jews without the actual population of Palestine being consulted.
From this standpoint they have never wavered, and as all offers of a
share in the government of the country have been made to them by the
British with the preliminary condition that they should accept the
National Home, all such offers have been rejected.
The War-time Promises:
(b) to the Jews
What proportion of the commitments entered into to
favour the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine was due
to sympathy with, and insight into, the historic longing of the Jews for
a return to Palestine, and what proportion was due to political
calculation as to the advantage which would be gained for the Allies by
cultivating the friendship of the Jewish people, it will never be
possible to decide, for human motives are nearly always mixed. But this
much at least can be said, that it would be inaccurate to omit either
completely. For nearly a century before the war British interest had
been shown in the Jewish longing for a home of their own, so that it is
idle to deny the idealistic side. On the other hand, Jewish opinion was
of importance in America, and, where Jews were concerned, the Allies
laboured under the disadvantage that they were fighting Germany, the
cultural centre of European Jewry, with, as an ally, Russia, the ruler
and persecutor of nearly one-half of the Jewish people. A gesture of
goodwill to Jewry was a politic move.
After conversations lasting more than a year, the
British Cabinet authorized Mr. Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, to write
to the head of British Jewry the following letter, dated 2 November
1917:
'His Majesty's Government view with favour the
establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and
will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this
object, it being dearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the dvil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
Communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by
the Jews in any other country.'
This letter is universally referred to as the Balfour
Declaration. But it was approved by President Wilson, and by the French
and Italian Governments, and was subsequently officially embodied in the
Mandate for Palestine, the text of which was finally ratified by the
League of Nations on 24 July 1922. While thus the Balfour Declaration is
continually referred to as the foundation-stone of the National Home, it
is impossible to keep a right proportion if it be forgotten that it only
gave official and international countenance to an aspect of Jewish life
which dated from the expulsion from .Palestine two thousand years ago.
This reality itself finds official acceptance in the preamble to the
Mandate which speaks of reconstituting the national home.
From the Jewish point of. view the essential clauses of
the Mandate are the 2nd, the 4th, and the 6th, which run as follows:
Articles
'The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the
country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as
will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down
in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and
also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the '
inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.'
Article 4
'An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a
public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the
Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters
as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the
interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and subject always to
the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the
development of the country.
"The Zionist organization, so long as its organization
and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall
be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with
His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all
Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish
national home.'
Article 6
'The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that
the rights and position of other sections of the population are not
prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable
conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish agency
referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land,
including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.'
Hie Dilemma
It has always been a matter of philosophic speculation
what would happen if an irresistible force met an immovable mass. In the
political field at any rate, it is now possible to answer the question.
For twenty years the irresistible force of Zionist enthusiasm has
encountered the immovable mass of Arab opposition to the official
foundation of its existence in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate.
And the result has been that the National Home has risen from less than
a hundred thousand to half a million and is still rising; that over
seventy million pounds have been invested in the country; that its total
population has almost doubled; that wages are higher than anywhere in
the Near East; that there have been two serious disturbances, and a
period of civil war lasting nearly three years; that there has been no
advance of any kind towards the creation of constitutional government;
that the country has been visited by one Royal Commission, several other
commissions, and experts on every subject from land tenure to
barbed-wire fencing; that the Balfour Declaration has been constantly
reaffirmed by the Mandatory government, and the. Mandate has proved
unworkable in practice; that both Jews and Arabs have developed a
technique of protest which should be the envy of tile whole world; that
the British Government, becoming more and more accustomed to the
impossibility of pleasing everybody, has resigned itself to pleasing
nobody; that Arabs and Jews have profited as considerably by the
presence of each other as they are determined to deny it, and that it
is, in consequence, almost impossible to describe the history of the
country not merely in such a way as to please either side, but even in
such a way as to be fair to them.
Such, in the political field at any rate, is the impact
of an irresistible force on an immovable mass! .
It is only by presenting the problem in this confused
way that it is possible to convey the atmosphere of reaction and
achievement, of paralysis and progress, which is modem Palestine.
The essential basis for understanding the situation is
the realization of two points. The clash in Palestine is a single
expression of the general clash between East and West. The Jewish
settlers are Europeans, Jewish standards of life are Western, Jewish
achievements are based on the technical skill and knowledge of American
and European science. The Arabs are still Eastern; their development
proceeds much more slowly; they can still be swayed by blind religious
fanaticism; in free competition with the Jews they fear that they would
have no chance. Secondly, it must be realized that to a very large
extent each of the three parties concerned has perfectly legitimate
reasons for acting as it has done. It is futile to explain the behaviour
of any entirely or even mainly in terms of malice or selfishness.
The Arabs formed 93 per cent. of the population at the
time when the Mandate formally embodied the Balfour Declaration into the
basic constitution of the country. But they were not consulted; their
protests were completely neglected; they were flatly told that they
could not be allowed even that measure of self-government allowed the
other Arab States, because of the promises made to the Jews;
British non-Jewish statesmen had publicly assumed that
they would become ultimately a minority in a Jewish State; Jewish
remarks constantly revived this fear even when British statesmen had
altered their opinion; matters were made worse by their being told that,
as Arabs, they ought to be satisfied with all the other Arab States
created by the victorious arms of the Allies. It is difficult to see
anything which was omitted which would ensure that their opposition
should remain a model of unconstructive intransigence, and, considering
their stage of civilization, it is regrettable but not surprising that
they have expressed themselves with a violence from which, to their
credit, the more disciplined Jews in the main have abstained.
The Jewish case is equally well founded. Their connexion
with Palestine extends over a period of more than three thousand years;
it has received the endorsement of the civilized world; every inch of
Palestine which they own and cultivate they have
bought in the open market from its Arab owner or, in a
few cases, leased from the Government; from top to bottom they have
constructed the National Home at their own expense, and their
contributions to the public revenue have been used more to help the
backward Arabs than themselves; they have never asked for anything
except the fulfilment of rights internationally guaranteed to them
twenty years ago, but far more urgently necessary to them now than their
original authors could possibly have imagined. For most of Europe has
become impossible for them, and the rest of the world only reluctantly
admits them.
They can point out, further, that much of the land which
they have bought was waste; that much of the land now refused them will
never be cultivated without the capital and knowledge they alone can
supply; that the most obvious proofs that their presence is an advantage
to the Arab are the facts that wages are highest and methods of
cultivation most modem in the neighbourhood of Jewish settlement; that
the Arab population has increased enormously; that many improvements in
medicine, hygiene, and education have been due to Jewish initiative, or
made possible by the taxes paid by Jews, while Arabs have benefited from
them equally with Jews; that they provide a market for the products of
the Arab peasant, and supply him with manufactured products in return.
And the British have to hold the scales between these
two incompatible and equally justifiable claims! Any act which favours
either side is immediately denounced as an injustice to the other. Two
communities live in Palestine, differing in language, standard of
living, and interest; educated in separate schools, each emphasizing one
of two totally different histories of the same country; each fearing to
be a minority under the other; each legitimately determined to secure
its own rights, and expecting the Government to see to the other side.
The description which has been given of the Jewish and
Arab arguments reveals a striking difference between them. The strength
of the Arab case is political. They were the overwhelming majority of
the country; the Powers which made the promise of the National Home
neither owned the country nor lived in it, and yet they did not consult
its inhabitants. Consequently, in the political field, the Arab has
unquestionably scored against the Jew, as the subsequent narrative will
show. The strength of the Jewish case is legal. Consequently, it has
nearly always obtained the support of the Mandates Commission of the
League of Nations which is charged with examining into the activities of
the Mandatory Power, and with reporting to the Council of the League
whether the latter is properly fulfilling the Mandate. Culturally,
socially, and emotionally the Jewish case is exceedingly strong.
Consequently the Government have persistently refused the Arab demand
that the doors should be closed immediately to further Jewish entry.
Perpetually occupied with making the best of the
difficulties created by one side or the other, it is not surprising if
the Government of Palestine has frequently vacillated and has had less
time and money available than it should have had for generally assisting
and developing the country. Too often the time of officials, both in
Whitehall and Jerusalem, is spent in calming passions and listening to
protests instead of getting on with the work of government.
The Political History of the Mandate
The Mandate was ratified by the League of Nations in
1922, and officially put into force in 1923, but decisive steps, based
on the permanence of the Balfour Declaration, had been taken by all the
parties concerned long before those years. The Declaration itself was
issued in November 1917. By the spring of the following year an
officially sponsored Zionist Commission, with representatives of the
British, French, and Italian Governments attached, was actively
surveying Jewish possibilities in the country, and planning the first
steps to the establishment of the National Home. And already in April
1920 riots and looting in Jerusalem gave the first signs of Arab
opposition to its establishment. In 1921 still more serious riots
started from Jaffa and spread to various parts of the country. The
Commission appointed to inquire into the riots found that one of the
main causes was the Arab fear of 'a steady increase of Jewish
immigration, which would ultimately tend to their political and economic
subjection'—and yet Jewish immigration had amounted to less than 26,000
in three years.
In i92iiand 1922 delegations representing Arab opinion,
both Moslem and Christian, visited London to put their grievances before
the British Government. They were assured that the British did not
contemplate their submergence in any sense—but they were refused any
constitutional freedom. They were offered a Legislative Council, but
refused on the ground that the British would control the majority of
seats, although the Arabs represented 90 per cent. of the population.
Next they were offered an Arab Agency, to fulfil for the Arabs the
function which the Zionist Commission, as a Jewish Agency, had been
filling since 1918 for the Jews. They refused. After this refusal the
Government gave up for the time being the attempt to develop
constitutional institutions as required by the Mandate.
Meanwhile the National Home-grew steadily. 7,400
immigrants entered in 1923, 12,800 in 1924, 33,800 in 1925, and the
Arabs watched with growing sullenness. In 1926 there was a break in the
flood, and in 1927 more Jews left Palestine than entered it. It seemed
to the Arabs as though the danger was over. But in 1928 the tide turned
and Arab indignation flared up again. In September there was an incident
at the 'Wailing Wall',' and the same period of the following year saw
riots and bloodshed all over the country. Religious fanaticism
occasioned the sudden flare-up, but the Shaw Commission which examined
into the riots found that the basic reason was the same—Arab fears of
submergence at .the rising tide of Jewish immigration—and in 1929-the
Jewish population already amounted to nearly 150,000.
The Commission found that some estimate of the amount of
land which was still available for the
' "The WaHing Wall' is the western wall of the ancient
Temple of Jerusalem, and thus the holiest spot for the Jews. But it is
Moslem property, and forms also the western wall of the enclosure
containing the Arab mosque on the site of the Temple.
settlement of new-comers was an urgent necessity, and
Sir John Hope Simpson, who had had extensive experience on such
questions in other countries, was sent to make a survey of the
possibilities. His report proved a serious blow to Jewish hopes, and,
though some of his figures have been challenged, his basic statement
appeared incontestable: that Palestine could not contain such a
population that a Jewish majority could ever become possible without the
dispossession of Arab inhabitants. He insisted that immigration should
be strictly limited, and the Government declared that it intended to
adjust its policy to. his recommendations. An immediate protest from the
Zionists caused them to modify their policy to some extent, but at the
same time the laws designed to secure the Arab tenant in the possession
of the minimum needed for his subsistence were strengthened.
For three years there was an appearance of peace. Jewish
immigration remained steady at about 5,000 until 1932, when it rose to
nearly 10,000. But in 1933 the advent of Hitler to power led to the
flight of thousands of Jews from Germany. Immigration rose to over
30,000 in 1933, to over 42,000 in 1934, and to nearly 62,000 in 1935.
The Jews, who had been 7 per cent. of the population when the Balfour
Declaration was given, amounted to nearly a third of the population
twenty years later.
The Arab reaction to the increase of 1932
had been the foundation of a new and still more intransigent political
party demanding immediate independence. In 1933 Arabs proclaimed a
movement of complete non-co-operation with the British,
which very soon led to sporadic violence
and bloodshed, and was followed in October 1933 by a general strike. In
December'1935 the Government attempted to meet the demands of the Arabs
by renewing the proposal to establish a legislative council, with a
non-official majority and a neutral chairman who was to be neither from
the British Administration nor a Palestinian. Although criticism of the
Mandate and control of immigration were to be outside its scope,
nevertheless the Arabs were disposed to consider it; but this time it
was the Jews who refused any co-operation with it, and secured its
decisive condemnation in Parliament.
More serious outbreaks began in April 1936,
with the additional disturbing feature that Arab officials of the
Mandatory Government declared their open support of the objects for
which their fellows were in arms. To cope with the seriousness of the
situation, it was announced that a Royal Commission would be sent to
Palestine to examine into the whole situation, as soon as violence had
ceased. Even so it was not until its final sessions that the Arabs
consented to appear before it, and that only at the persuasion of
neighbouring Arab kings and princes, who had already intervened to
persuade the Arabs to cease their violence.
The Royal Commission reported in July 1937
after having made an exhaustive survey of the whole development of the
situation since the beginning of the Mandate. On almost every page they
declared their conviction that a radical solution alone offered any
possibility of escaping from a recurrence of the disorders, and they
finally proposed that the country
should be divided into three areas: a
Jewish State primarily on the sea coast, an Arab State, primaril;
in the hills and joined to the existing
Arab State o Transjordan, and mandatory areas covering Jeru salem,
Nazareth, and Bethlehem together with ;
corridor from Jerusalem to Jaffa. This
proposa took the world completely by surprise. The Govern ment published
its acceptance of it in principle, bu both Jews and Arabs protested
vigorously against il although some Jews were seriously tempted by th
illusion of independence which it contained. Oi the one hand was a
Jewish State without Jerusalen and little larger than the English county
of Norfolli and on the other hand an Arab State deprived o most of the
best land and without real access to th sea. A further Commission was
sent but to sugges boundaries for this multiplicity of States within
total area of the size of Wales, and drew maps o two new alternative
schemes, neither of which had th support of all the members of the
Commission, am neither of which they really believed to be workable All
this time sporadic disturbances were takin:
place, and they were still continuing when
th Partition Commission reported in October 1938 The lack of enthusiasm
of the Commission itsel revealed that such a solution was impossible,
and i:
one final effort to discover a way out of
the impasse Jews and Arabs were summoned to confer wit the British in
London in February 1939. In th 'hope that they might exercise a
restraining influence representatives were also invited from other Ara!
States and Egypt. But the Arabs refused to meet th Jews, and both sides
refused the proposals of th
British Government. The Conferences broke
up without achieving anything, and the British Government was left in
the unhappy position of having to declare its own policy, knowing that
it would receive the support of neither side. This it did in the White
Paper issued in May 1939 by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald as Colonial Secretary,
and it is this document which is the present basis of British policy in
Palestine. ^
There are four main points in this latest
attempt to escape from the impasse created by the Balfour Declaration
and by Arab resistance to it.
i. After a transitional period, estimated
at ten years, it is hoped that an independent Palestine may be brought
into existence. It is also hoped that representative institutions may be
steadily developed in the intervening period.
ii. This independent State is to be in
close treaty relations with Great Britain, and the Treaty is to ensure
the safeguarding of the rights of the Jewish National Home.
iii. For the coming five years a Jewish
immigration of 10,000 is to be permitted, annually. In addition 25,000
refugees are to be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is
satisfied that they can be absorbed. After this number of 75,000 has
been admitted, no further immigration will be allowed without the
acquiescence of the Arabs. Thus, unless Arab agreement can be achieved,
the obligation to further the National Home is to be considered as
fulfilled when the Jewish population reaches a proportion of roughly
one-third of the inhabitants of the country.
iv. As soon as they can be
drawn up, regulations will be issued restricting Jewish rights to
purchase land in certain areas of the country.
The regulations referred to in the last
clause were issued in February 1940. They proved unexpectedly severe on
Jewish hopes, and made it almost impossible for them to extend their
purchases of land in by far the larger part of the country.
The White Paper and the subsequent land
regulations have produced a storm of opposition within Jewry. In the
tragic circumstances of to-day that storm is completely understandable.
But it has also to be asked whether any alternative was possible, so
long as the existing conflict continued. For the last ten years the
British have constantly been repeating that a solution can only be found
in Palestine through Jews and Arabs making peace with each other; that
mere fulfilment of the Mandate, apart from the consent of the Arabs, can
only mean permanent rule by force, a condition impossible for a British
Government to impose, and ultimately as intolerable for Jews as it would
be for Arabs to accept.
On the terrain of politics Arab claims are
as strong as their conduct has been deplorable. In relation to them the
Jewish claims, in spite of their legal strength, are as weak as
their conduct under immense provocation has been admirable. Palestine is
still waiting for the Solomon, whether British, Jew, or Arab, who will
produce a political solution. Were this the whole story, one might well
despair of any solution ever being discovered. But politics are not
everything even in these days of nationalism. To
estimate the real future of Palestine, it
is not only necessary, but much more encouraging, to consider what has
been achieved in twenty years in spite of sporadic and sometimes
continuous periods of strife and bloodshed.
From Shadow to Sunshine
It is a relief to turn .from this tragic
political history to the actual story of the country in the daily life
and occupations of its inhabitants. For none of the paradoxes that the
world can offer are as startling as the contrast between the barren
stagnation of the political conflict, which suggests a country in which
neither change nor progress can be expected, and the transformation of
life wrought in the last twenty years, which would appear to have been
possible only in a land of complete peace, harmony, and security.
The British Administration, which developed
into the Mandatory Government, took over a country wasted by the
retiring Turkish armies. Fields were uncultivated, live stock scarcely
existed, the land registers themselves had been carried off,
trade was stagnant. The Government has often been criticized for the
smallness of the scope of its social programme. Yet the country is now
covered with an increasing network of modem roads for motor traffic;
education in the Arab villages is slowly progressing and is
enthusiastically received by the villagers, although it is still far
from universal;
health services are gradually eliminating
endemic disease and reducing the rate of infant mortality;
above all, efforts are being made to
improve the
quality and extent of Arab agriculture. In
many villages permanent division of the holdings is giving the
individual cultivator the security which he must have if he is to be
encouraged to improve his land; laws have been passed lessening interest
on debt and reducing tithe; teaching is given on rural co-operatives and
a number have already been created. In the towns new Arab enterprises
are appearing.
In the neighbourhood of Jewish settlements
the Arab is learning even faster by example, and it is one of the
encouraging features of the situation— even if it is. not so recognized
by Arab politicians —that the standards of Arab living and cultivation,
as well as the level of wages for labourers, are rising all the time in
the neighbourhood of the Jewish settlements and Jewish Agricultural
Research Institutes.
But the real romance of Palestine is the
work achieved by the Jews. It is of course still ragged, still full of
improvisations and imperfections, still inevitably too self-centred and
nationalistic. All sorts of criticisms may be levelled at it by its
enemies and detractors, but the Zionist can legitimately reply:
Considering the material at our disposal—a town-bred population from
eastern Europe, middle-class, sometimes middle-aged refugees from
Germany—has anyone ever done better, has any other large-scale
pioneering produced such results in so short a time? Moreover, most
pioneers received their land free, or paid very small prices for it. The
Jews had to pay for every acre on which they settled at prices often
much in excess of the real value of the land.
It was pure national idealism which drove
the original settlers to cultivate the soil of Palestine with their own
hands. In time many of the older colonists became middle-class farmers
employing cheap Arab labour, but the stream of Jews determined to till
their own soil with their own hands has been constantly renewed, and it
is now backed by training schools for youthful refugees in England and
many other countries. With the background of first-class Agricultural
Institutes and Training Colleges, miracles have been performed. Deep
ploughing, irrigation, and the proper use of manure is gradually making
it possible to grow three or four crops in a year where only one could
be grown previously, to produce a thousand bushels of corn where less
than a quarter would, under the Arab system, be reckoned a splendid
crop. The study of cattle-breeding is raising the possible annual yield
of milk five and ten times; even hens are being persuaded by proper
treatment to lay three times as many eggs!
Owing to the fact that much of the land
belongs to Jewish public funds, which can plan ahead and on a broad
basis, land can be set aside for planting forests. This is an extremely
important item in a country which has been robbed of its trees for
centuries. Irrigation has made thousands of acres of sand-dune and
desert into excellent agricultural and fruit-growing land, and the
draining of swamps has led to the disappearance of malaria, a disease
which carried off hundreds of the earliest pioneers. But the Movement is
not merely a romantic 'back to the land' revival. Industry has also
developed amazingly. The most famous works lie in the
Jordan Valley. In the north, near to the
Sea of Galilee, is the Jordan Hydro-electric Power Station which
supplies most of the inhabitants, Arab as well as Jewish, with power and
light, so that pioneers establishing a new settlement can light their
tents electrically their first night, and use electric power from the
very beginning of their clearing, draining, and planting operations. In
the south are the Dead Sea Chemical Works, which are gradually
extracting potash and bromine from the world's largest reservoir of
chemicals. The only British supply of potash comes from these works,
which are capable of supplying all the world's needs of that article for
5,000 years at its present rate of consumption. And it is interesting
that in both these enterprises, especially the latter, Jews and Arabs
have worked side by side all through the troubles. In Tel-Aviv, Haifa,
and elsewhere, over a thousand smaller industrial enterprises have been
started, and the level of Palestinian exports has risen steadily every
year, while more and more of the home market is supplied from home
production.
As the basis of this agricultural and
industrial development stand two social experiments of the greatest
interest. Much of the agricultural work is run by villages which
practise varieties of 'communism', not as a philosophy of life and class
conflict but, as it should be, as a satisfactory economic basis of
existence. In some, individuals have no money at all, except when they
go on Holiday; in others, more individual possessions are allowed. By
the establishment of communal creches and nurses, children can be given
the attention usually only obtained by the
offspring of the wealthy. The community,
both in its work and leisure, can afford what the individual labourer
could never hope to possess in tools, in books, in lectures and
concerts. Such communities have grown experimentally, not according to a
preconceived theory, and suggest all kinds of possibilities to depressed
areas in other countries.
The other movement behind this expansion is
the Labour Organization, a movement containing the great majority of the
adult Jews in the country, and much more than a Trade Union in that it
also runs all kinds of co-operative organizations, loan-banks, medical
services, its own hospitals and clinics, its own schools, and even a
contracting department which competes for government and other contracts
for roads, buildings, and other public services. The extent of its
unconventional activities can be gathered from the fact that its health
budget is almost as large as that of the Government itself.
Health is, in fact, one of the activities
in which Zionists have performed the most valuable services to the
country as a whole. Medical research is already making' the Hebrew
University a centre whose importance is recognized far beyond the
frontiers of the country, and the modem equipment and method of the
Jewish hospitals, clinics, infant welfare centres, and convalescent
homes bring to both Jew and Arab services available in no other country
of the Near East, and few countries of Europe and America. This work has
been considerably aided by Germany's expulsion of hundreds of her ablest
doctors. In fact, it is said that at
a certain moment a telegram was sent to the
Jewish Emigration Office: 'Send no more doctors, send patients.'
As much thought has been given by the
Zionists to education, both infant and adult, as to health. Illiteracy
is unknown among the Jewish settlers, and in many of the colonies and
settlements education on the most modem lines is given. The task
undertaken was no light one. The returning Jews came from a multitude of
backgrounds, and with many languages. Few of them knew Hebrew, which has
become the Jewish language of the country;
many were ignorant of Jewish history;
many—and this was especially true of immigrants from Germany —came from
necessity rather than choice. All had to be blended together into the
National Home, and it is a tribute to its strength and flexibility that
such a blending is in fact taking place. There is still one gap in. the
educational system, affecting both Jews and Arabs. With few exceptions
they leam in the schools of each almost nothing of the life, the
history, the language even, of the other. The schools are not yet
building young Palestinians. • They are. building young Jews and Arabs,
and it is certain that if A
political change is to come an educational change along these lines will
have to accompany it.
Beyond the -ordinary Jewish school system,
the greater part of which incidentally is supported by the Jews
themselves and not by the Government, there are adequate technical and
agricultural colleges and, at the crown of the whole, the Hebrew
University on Mount Scopas outside Jerusalem. It is as
much a research 'centre as a teaching
establishment. It is still developing its faculties, but It grows each
year, and now has more than a thousand students. In times of peace it
enrols already a few Arab students into its membership. And it stands as
the symbol of the Jewish passion for education, realized in a community
of less than half a million people (in Britain there are sixteen
universities to 46,000,000 people).
The intellectual life of the community,
however, is not confined merely to schools and university. There are
first-class concerts, operatic and dramatic companies, and again the
flight from Germany has brought blessing to Palestine. The Jewish Labour
Organization even runs its own dramatic company;
and world-famous conductors and musicians
find working-class audiences in Palestine as enthusiastic and as
critical as the most select audiences of London or Paris. ;
The National Home is still in fits infancy.
It is still living on the enthusiasm of novelty. But it has already been
tested by economic crisis, by political conflict, and by
disillusionment; it proved its stability and elasticity when it
unexpectedly was called on to absorb in three years not ten, but over a
hundred, thousand new immigrants. It has already its heroes and its
martyrs. Doubtless severe conflicts and severe testing still lie before
it, but there is every reason to be optimistic about its survival.
Political wisdom is (he slowest of all wisdoms to learn, and it is
political mistakes which alone can imperil it. The same is true of the
Arabs. For, if the romance of modem Palestine be Jewish, the slower
progress of
the Arabs is an essential part of the
picture, and Jewish-Arab co-operation and mutual influence cannot be
permanently prevented by the political activities of either side.
This consequence should be the more certain
because of the situation of Palestine. Experiments in the deliberate
construction of a new community have usually taken place in the remoter
comers of the world. Groups of pioneers have gone off to distant spots
to work out their ideals. But Palestine is inevitably in the centre of
the world's movements, and is admirably placed to receive and transmit
spiritual influence and material products to both East and West.
To-day it is British communications which
make it an essential link in the British world empire. The link would be
as essential if it were not British. Air routes and desert routes would
still be the same. The pipe-line would still need to come to the sea
coast. Haifa would still be an important port, a natural outlet arid
receiving port for the whole hinterland of northern and central Arabia.
In the same way, Kipling's saying that
'East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet', is
inevitably breaking down, and in both directions; and in the growing
need of East and West of each other, Palestine stands as a gate between
the two, and the very conflict in Palestine is partly a miniature of the
conflict between two standards of living, two conceptions of life, which
is going on in many parts of the world. The inter-penetration of the two
cultures, the industries, and the agriculture of Palestine have their
part to play in
this growth, for while agriculture of
different kinds absorbs the bulk of the people of the East, experiments
conducted in their own climate have a validity such as the experience of
European or American agriculture could not have. Further, the. one
market for industry still unsaturated is the market south of the
temperate zone, and Palestine is naturally placed to serve wide
undeveloped areas of the Near or Middle Eastern world. And it is in the
non-political atmosphere of daily relations that the beginnings of
cultural understanding may take ' place.
How and when the political problem will be
solved it is impossible to say. Until it is solved the future of
Palestine, is inevitably precarious. But its possibilities and its
achievements are already so considerable that it is difficult to believe
that a political solution will not be found.
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